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I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this essay is twofold. First, I want both to
show that state constitutions have been an important source of
fundamental law and a basis for judicial review and to argue that
the bar and bench of every state should take seriously the poten-
tial of its state constitution. Second, I want to define what I call,
"constitutional jurisprudence," to indicate briefly how it affects le-
gal argument and judicial decisionmaking concerning the federal
Constitution, and to urge lawyers and state courts to articulate a
constitutional jurisprudence for their own state constitution, based
* B.A., University of Montana, 1980; M.A., University of Montana, 1985; J.D., Univer-
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on legal, historical, and cultural characteristics of their state.
This essay, then, begins with a definition of constitutional ju-
risprudence, together with some introductory remarks about its
importance. This introduction is followed by an historical survey of
the role of state constitutions as a basis for judicial review, from
the colonial period to the present, to demonstrate the precedent
f9r and potential use of state constitutions. It is argued that cur-
rent state court judicial review demonstrates a need for a constitu-
tional jurisprudence to guide the construction of a state constitu-
tion. Once this historical foundation has been laid, it is appropriate
to consider the concerns addressed by theories of constitutional ju-
risprudence concerning the federal Constitution and to examine
some examples of such theories. Finally, these jurisprudential con-
cerns are considered in light of some distinct differences between
state constitutions and governments and the federal Constitution
and government. From this analysis, it is concluded that in many
important respects, theories of federal constitutional jurisprudence
are not appropriate to state constitutions.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE AND ITS LEGAL ROLE
From its Latin derivation, the term jurisprudence means wis-
dom about law. This wisdom, however, is not simply knowledge of
the laws; rather it is an attempt to understand how the laws fit
together and what sort of overarching principles provide the glue
to keep them together."
Constitutional jurisprudence is a species of jurisprudence. It is
concerned with a certain kind of law, fundamental law. A constitu-
tion is fundamental in that it founds the institutions that will be
responsible for enacting all other laws and purports to demarcate
the respective powers of and restrictions upon these institutions.
Because the United States Constitution does not explicitly ad-
dress what legal effect it should have, answering this question has
been the primary task of constitutional jurisprudence in this coun-
try. This question has been asked as two theoretically distinct but
practically interrelated questions.2 First, what is the courts' role in
enforcing the Constitution? In other words, what is the scope of
1. Jurisprudence can be "analytical ... [which] is concerned with the clarification of
the general framework of legal thought .... " H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (preface)
(1981). Or, it can be critical, that is, it is an attempt to criticize how our laws, do in fact
hang together, and to suggest what overarching principles ought to be reflected in the struc-
ture and content of our laws.
2. See J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESs: A FUNC-
TIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SuPREME COURT 1 (1980).
[Vol. 46
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the courts' power of judicial review? Second, since the Constitution
itself does not articulate a principle to guide interpretation of it,
how are the courts to interpret it?
Different persons who have reflected on these questions have
given a variety of answers. Their readings of the Constitution, of
course, often reflect concerns that have arisen within a broader
context of historical analysis and political philosophy. But how is
constitutional jurisprudence pertinent to legal argument or judicial
decisionmaking? During an address he made at a jurisprudence
conference in 1984, Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals James Browning, though not intending to belittle jurispru-
dence, candidly stated that he did not consult jurisprudential theo-
ries when he voted on outcomes of cases before his court.' Given
traditional legal education, his comment is quite understandable.
At first glance, the processes of legal argument and decisionmaking
do not seem to require an understanding of how various laws, in-
cluding constitutional provisions, fit together. Since Marbury v.
Madison,4 the permissibility of judicial review has been firmly es-
tablished, and lawyers and judges have been taught to look only to
the words of the provision at issue and the construction that courts
in prior cases have given to it.
Nevertheless, in the same way that scientific data is meaning-
less without a theory,5 the words of a text do not interpret them-
selves. As theologians, literary critics, and historians have discov-
ered, some interpretational theory is required to interpret texts.6
An argument for constitutional jurisprudence also relies on this
premise. Since laws are texts, a theory of interpretation, outside of
the texts but related to the texts, is required to interpret them.
As legal realists have recognized, all judges, whether con-
sciously or unconsciously, bring to their judicial review and their
interpretation of constitutional provisions extraneous principles,
experiences, and emotions.7 The formulation by a judge of a juris-
prudential theory would inhibit ad hoc decisions, based on that
3. Judge Browning's remarks were made at a conference entitled "Standards and Lim-
its for Judicial Decisionmaking-A Conference on Jurisprudence," held at the University of
Montana School of Law, May 18, 1984.
4. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). For a good analysis of this decision, see Van Alstyne,
A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1.
5. For a discussion of the role of theory in scientific research, see T. KUHN, THE STRuc-
TURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970).
6. For an attempt to use the study of literature in teaching legal analysis and writing,
see J. WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION: STUDIES IN THE NATURE OF LEGAL THOUGHT AND Ex-
PRESSION (1973).
7. For a good statement of this "legal realist" claim, see Pound, The Call for a Realist
Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1931).
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judge's immediate reaction to a particular case; for if that reaction
were to become the basis of decision, either it would have to be
justified according to the jurisprudential theory or the theory
would have to be modified to account for the judge's conviction in
that particular case.
That different jurisprudential theories have led to different in-
terpretations of the same provision strengthens, rather than weak-
ens, an argument for constitutional jurisprudence.8 For if we as-
sume a subjective interpretation of constitutional provisions by
judges, surely a consistency among a judge's subjective interpreta-
tions founded on a jurisprudential theory would be of greater ser-
vice to society than inconsistent interpretations. First, this would
be true because persons could at least formulate certain expecta-
tions on the basis of which they could lead their lives with some
confidence." Secondly, connecting a legal argument or decision to
an explicit, jurisprudential theory would provide a better founda-
tion for debate about the assumptions judges make but do not
state in their opinions.
Given this context, it is clear that state court judges, even
more than federal judges, need an understanding of constitutional
jurisprudence. They not only need a theory for the federal Consti-
tution but also one for their own state constitution.
III. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW
Over the past century, federal courts, armed with the four-
teenth amendment, have extensively reviewed state laws and acts.
Because of this federal court activity and the academic and politi-
cal reactions to it, people-including lawyers and judges-have
had the impression that state courts seldom engaged in judicial re-
view based on provisions of their own state constitution."0 Not un-
til very recently, on account of a retrenchment by the Burger
Court in some areas of constitutional law, have many lawyers,
judges, and commentators begun to take a close look at their state
8. But see Ronald Dworkin's apparent conviction that a "Herculean" jurisprudence
could lead to the "right" decision in a case. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81-130
(1977). For a criticism of this view, see Hart, American Jurisprudence Through English
Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream, 11 GA. L. REV. 969, 982-86 (1977).
9. This would enrich the legal principle that there ought not to be ex post facto laws.
10. A good indication of this is the degree to which lawyers continue to neglect plead-
ing state constitutional or statutory grounds in addition to federal constitutional grounds.
Some state courts have begun to require that state grounds be considered first. See Carson,
"Last Things Last": A Methodological Approach to Legal Argument in State Courts, 19
WILLA MErE L. REV. 641 (1983).
[Vol. 46
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constitutions.1 From the 1780's to the present, however, state
courts have quietly engaged in judicial review in many areas of
state constitutional law.
A brief overview of state judicial review is important for two
reasons. First, it emphasizes that state courts have not been as
dormant as the lack of discussion about them would suggest. Sec-
ond, although Marbury v. Madison and subsequent United States
Supreme Court cases 12 established the right of the Supreme Court
to review acts of both the coordinate branches of the federal gov-
ernment and the state governments, a state constitutional jurispru-
dence ought to begin with an examination of state court precedent
for judicial review.
It is often overlooked that state constitutions had existed a
decade before the federal Constitution was adopted. Eleven of the
thirteen original colonies adopted constitutions for themselves
within the eighteen month span from January of 1776 to June of
1777, when the Articles of Confederation were adopted. 3 The
other two colonies operated under their colonial charters. 4
But constitutionalism did not spring forth fully developed
from the minds of the colonials in 1776. The drafters of the first
state constitutions were deeply influenced by political theorists,
notably John Locke and Baron de Montesquieu, who had recom-
mended constitutional governments.' 5 They were also influenced
by their colonial experience under English rule, particularily the
extensive power of Parliament and the arbitrary actions of colonial
governors appointed by the King.'"
Although after the Glorious Revolution of 1688 great conces-
sions of power had been exacted from the King by Parliament,
11. See, e.g., Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,
90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977); Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of
the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REV. 873 (1976); Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Pro-
cedure: State Court Evasion of the Burger Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421 (1974).
12. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 304 (1816) and Cohens v. Vir-
ginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264 (1821) (establishing the constitutional power of the Supreme
Court to review decisions of state courts).
13. See W. ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY AND THE
MAKING OF THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA 5 (1980); 1 B. SCHWARTZ,
THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 234-379 (1971) (for the texts of the state bills
of rights).
14. SCHWARTZ, supra note 13, at 289 (Connecticut and Rhode Island).
15. See P. SMITH, THE CONSTITUTION: A DOCUMENTARY AND NARRATIVE HISTORY 37-39
(1980); C. WILTSE, THE JEFFERSONIAN TRADITION IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 37, 49 (1935).
16. See ADAMS, supra note 13, at 20 (the colonists considered some of Parliament's
acts void). See also the colonists' 1765 Declaration of Rights and Grievances, which ex-
pressed their concern about the arbitrariness of the Crown's rule of the colonies, quoted in
SCHWARTZ, supra note 13, at 196-99.
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concessions which made up in part what was called England's un-
written constitution, the powers of Parliament itself remained un-
limited; there was no written constitution that restricted it.17 The
contrast between the unlimited powers of Parliament and the limi-
tations imposed upon the colonial legislative bodies by written
charters left its mark on the first state constitutions. The drafters
of those constitutions intended as much to limit government as to
establish it.' 8 They limited state government through both its de-
sign and specific provisions protecting individual rights. 9
Thus, these first state constitutions also served as models
against which the protections of the proposed federal Constitution
were measured. It was the outcry for the addition of a Bill of
Rights to the federal Constitution made at the state ratifying con-
ventions that prompted the first Congress to do so; and it was to
the state constitutional experience that James Madison turned for
ideas in drafting a federal Bill of Rights. °
Likewise, the idea of judicial review did not begin with Mar-
bury. Even during colonial rule, Americans invoked Lord Coke's
assertion in 1610 in Dr. Bonham's Case21 that "when an Act of
Parliament is against common right and reason, or repugnant, or
impossible to be performed, the common law will control it, and
adjudge such Act to be void." These colonial assertions were later
echoed by state courts as principles of state constitutional law in at
least eight cases between 1780 and 1787.22 It was because of this
preexisting context for judicial review in state courts that assump-
tions about the propriety of federal judicial review could be made
in the Federalist Papers23 and by Justice Marshall in Marbury.24
State courts continued to exercise judicial review and construe
their state constitutions in the nineteenth century. Because the
Supreme Court decided early on, in Barron v. Mayor of Balti-
17. See A. SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA: ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF ITS
FUNDAMENTAL IDEAS 91-100 (1965).
18. See ADAMS, supra note 13, at 55-93. For an example of how the states experi-
mented and borrowed ideas from each other in this process, see SCHWARTZ, supra note 13, at
374.
19. ADAMS, supra note 13, at 156-63, 266-71.
20. See SUTHERLAND, supra note 17, at 180; SMITH, supra note 15, at 288 (Madison
presented a list of rights essentially identical to the Virginia state bill of rights).
21. 8 Rep. 114, 2 Brown 255, 77 Eng. Rep. 647 (1610). For a discussion of its influence
on colonial Americans, see SUTHERLAND, supra note 17, at 62.
22. SCHWARTZ, supra note 13, at 403.
23. For a discussion of judicial review, see THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 485-86 (A. Ham-
ilton) (Lodge ed. 1888).
24. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
[Vol. 46
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more,25 that the federal Bill of Rights was not applicable to the
laws or actions of state governments, the enforcement of individual
liberties was left to the state courts. Thus, it was the state courts
that were confronted with a great number of constitutional chal-
lenges concerning individual rights.
State courts, like the United States Supreme Court, took an
interest in protecting individual property rights. The federal doc-
trine of economic substantive due process had prototypes in state
constitutional decisions dating from 1855.26 Whereas the federal
courts abandoned the doctrine of economic substantive due pro-
cess in the 1930s,27 some state courts continued to apply it.2
8
State constitutional decisions have not been restricted to
property'rights. For example, significant decisions were made con-
cerning the free exercise of religion,2 9 a fact made poignant by the
identification of many of the original colonies with particular sects.
Such cases included permitting an atheist to be a juror, 0 eliminat-
ing religious tests for competency of witnesses and competency to
vote,3 1 and granting conscientious objector status to avoid required
service in the state militia.32 Freedom of speech and the press were
also litigated. 33
Long before federal courts were construing the broad due pro-
cess provisions of the fifth and fourteenth amendments, state
courts were exercising judicial review of state government acts
based on broad "inalienable rights" clauses in state constitutions.3
For example, in one very interesting but unique 1848 case, the
Tennessee court struck down, as violative of "the liberty of a free
person" by restraining him from "the exercise of his lawful pur-
suits," an ordinance authorizing the arrest and fining of free blacks
25. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 242 (1833).
26. See, e.g., Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378 (1856).
27. See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
28. See Paulsen, The Persistence of Substantive Due Process in the States, 34 MINN.
L. REv. 91 (1950). See also Note, Developments in the Law-The Interpretation of State
Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1324, 1463-93 (1982).
29. See generally C. ANTIEAU, RELIGION UNDER STATE CONSTITUTIONS (1965).
30. See, e.g., McClure v. State, 9 Tenn. (1 Yerg.) 206 (1829).
31. See, e.g., Hroneck v. People, 134 Ill. 139, 24 N.E. 861 (1890).
32. See, e.g., Dole v. Allen, 4 Me. (4 Greanleaf) 527 (1827).
33. See, e.g., Dailey v. Superior Court, 112 Cal. 94, 44 P. 458 (1896)(right to stage a
play based on defendant's story, during defendant's trial); State v. Sykes, 28 Conn. 225
(1859) (state prohibition of the sale of lottery tickets does not violate the right to a free
press).
34. See, e.g., St. Louis v. Roche, 128 Mo. 541, 31 S.W. 915 (1895) (law that makes
associating with reputed thieves unlawful violates the right to personal liberty); cf. Ex parte
Smith, 38 Cal. 702 (1869) (prohibition of the playing of instruments or the presence of
women in saloons after midnight does not violate inalienable rights).
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if they were out after ten o'clock at night.3 5
Early in this century, many states enforced state constitu-
tional provisions concerning rights of the accused. For example, in
the 1920's, long before the United Supreme Court made the fourth
amendment applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment, the Montana Supreme Court adopted its own exclu-
sionary rule to enforce the Montana Constitution's search and
seizure provision.3
It is true that in this century state constitutions in many sub-
stantive areas were eclipsed by the federal Constitution. From the
1930's to the early 1970's the United States Supreme Court,
through the fourteenth amendment, construed federal constitu-
tional rights to afford greater protection than many states had pro-
vided through their own constitutions. The Court first acted in the
areas of freedom of religion and speech, but then in the 1960's, it
revolutionized criminal procedure through its construction of the
due process clause. 7
Since the early 1970's, however, some retrenchment has oc-
curred in Supreme Court decisions in all these areas.38 This re-
trenchment coincided with a desire in many states to articulate in
their state constitutions some of the principles that had been in-
voked by the Warren Court.3 9 Both of these series of events rejuve-
nated the use of state constitutions to protect fundamental rights.
This revival of the significance of the state constitution has grown
dramatically in the last few years. Not only have state constitu-
tions become authority for state decisions, but a body of articles
and commentaries on these decisions is beginning to develop.40
This revival has encountered some obstacles. Many lawyers
and judges, being used to relying on federal cases to argue consti-
tutional law, have blurred federal and state constitutions. As a re-
sult of this blurring, the Burger Court has considerably increased
its discretionary review, and ultimate reversal, of cases that have
been appealed by state executive or legislative branches from state
courts which, on both state and federal constitutional grounds, af-
35. Memphis v. Winfield, 27 Tenn. (8 Humph.) 707, 709 (1848).
36. State ex rel. Samlin v. District Court, 59 Mont. 600, 198 P. 362 (1921).
37. For an historical account of this period, see F. GRAHAM, THE DUE PROCESS REVOLU-
TION: THE WARREN COURT'S IMPACT ON CRIMINAL LAW (1970); R. MCCLOSKEY, THE MODERN
SUPREME COURT (1972).
38. See supra note 11.
39. See Galie, The Other Supreme Courts: Judicial Activism Among State Supreme
Courts, 33 SYRACUSE L. REV. 731, 734 (1982) (listing unique state constitutional provisions).
40. See, e.g, Carson, supra note 10; Galie, supra note 39; Note, supra note 28; Ger-
stein, California's Constitutional Right to Privacy: The Development of the Protection of
Private Life, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 385 (1982). See also supra note 11.
268 [Vol. 46
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forded greater constitutional protection to individuals."1 Although
acknowledging that state courts may construe their constitutions
more protectively than the Supreme Court construes the federal
Constitution, the Court has insisted that such state court decisions
must clearly be based on independent and adequate state
grounds. 42
This requirement means that although state courts may still
construe both the federal and state constitutions or even use fed-
eral opinions to aid in construing their own constitution, their de-
cisions must evidence a clear demarcation between the respective
analyses of the two constitutional provisions."3 It also means that
any federal case law used as authority for a particular construction
of the state constitutional provision must be considered persuasive,
not mandatory, authority.4'
Since federal authority is merely persuasive in construing state
constitutions, state courts ought to examine it critically. To facili-
tate this evaluation of federal case law, state courts must first eval-
uate the jurisprudential concerns implicit in that case law. By do-
ing this and then reflecting on the particular configuration of these
concerns in its own state government and constitution, state courts
will have a basis for determining the appropriateness of a federal
decision to the construction of their state constitution. Having
done so, they will also be well on their way toward developing a
theory of state constitutional jurisprudence.
IV. A SURVEY OF FEDERAL JURISPRUDENCE
As already stated, there are two crucial questions of constitu-
tional jurisprudence. First, what is the scope of the courts' power
of judicial review? Second, how are the courts to interpret it? Not
all theories of constitutional jurisprudence explicitly distinguish
these two questions or treat them with equal significance. Some
theories address one of the questions through the particular an-
swer they give to the other. Nevertheless, because in principle the
two questions are distinguishable and because some commentators
have done so, they are treated separately in this section. However,
when a particular theory of interpretation strongly implies a corre-
41. There was a significant number of such cases in the 1983 term alone and an even
greater number of petitions in 1984. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1070 n.3 (1983)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
42. See Elison and NettikSimmons, Federalism and State Constitutions: The New
Doctrine of Independent and Adequate State Grounds, 45 MONT. L. REv. 177 (1984).
43. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. at 1090-91.
44. Id.
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sponding theory of the scope of judicial review, it is noted.
Before discussing these two questions, it is helpful to have a
framework in which to place the particular theories discussed.
Thus, it is appropriate at this time to mention some of the signifi-
cant concerns that these theories address. There are at least four.
The first concern is about how we ought to balance democratic
government and individual rights. Different theories, of course,
weigh the competing interests differently, some emphasizing de-
mocracy and others, individual rights.
A second concern is about what is the proper domain for the
exercise of the sovereignty of the states and the federal govern-
ment. This is often characterized as a concern for federalism. It
not only arises in determining whether federal laws are constitu-
tional and whether they thus preempt state laws, but federalism is
also a factor that the Court must consider when it is asked to im-
pose a constitutional standard upon all fifty states through the
fourteenth amendment.
A third issue that concerns theories of constitutional jurispru-
dence is how to balance the roles of the other two coordinate
branches of government with the role of the judiciary. This con-
cern is inherent in both the concept and practice of judicial review,
since judicial review requires the court to nullify the act of one of
the other two branches.
The fourth concern pertains to the role of the judiciary itself.
It addresses the judiciary's strengths and weaknesses. Whether a
particular type of judicial review or judicial interpretation is ap-
propriate often hinges on a theory's assessment of the structure of
the judiciary itself.
A. What Should Be the Scope of Judicial Review?
Few, if any, commentators would seriously suggest that it is
unconstitutional for the Court to review the acts of the states and
the other federal branches of government. Although the Constitu-
tion does not explicitly provide for it, judicial review had prece-
dent in the common law and in the state courts. Likewise, as the
Federalist Paper No. 78 and Justice Marshall in Marbury con-
cluded, judicial review legitimately seems to follow from the as-
sumptions that the Court is to interpret the law in the cases that
come before it and that a written constitution, though fundamen-
tal law, is still a law.
Disregarding the effect of interpretational theories on the
scope of judicial review, the question boils down to whether courts
should be prone to engage in judicial review or whether they
[Vol. 46270
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should be reluctant to do so out of deference to the sovereignty of
the states and the determinations of coordinate branches of the
federal government. The jurisprudential positions corresponding to
these alternatives have been characterized as judicial activism and
judicial restraint.45 It is important in using these designations,
however, that a particular court's activism or restraint in particular
areas be distinguished from a jurisprudential theory of activism or
restraint, which advocates activism or restraint as a matter of prin-
ciple or analysis of the structure and function of the court.4"
An example of a theory that encourages judicial activism is
that of Thomas Grey. Grey has argued that courts should enforce
what he calls the "unwritten constitution. '4 7 Essentially, this
would give the courts broad authority, on the basis of extra-consti-
tutional principles discoverable by the court, to strike down laws
promulgated by the states or other branches of government.48 Like
most theories advocating activism, Grey's theory is premised on a
distrust for democratic processes and a concomitant allegiance to
the protection of individual rights. It also demonstrates a faith in
the unique capacity of the courts to discover these unwritten prin-
ciples and to apply them to legislative or executive action.
At the other end of the spectrum, Alexander Bickel has argued
for greater restraint by the Court on the basis of his structural
analysis of the judiciary.49 First, he notes, the "case or contro-
versy" requirement of Article III, embodies a recognition about the
domain of the governmental power of the judiciary that is deeply
rooted in Anglo-American common law. Courts may interpret the
Constitution only to decide cases or controversies. They are not
structurally equipped to be constitutional or statutory rulemakers.
In addition to this structural need for courts to interpret the
law in the context of a controversy, Bickel invokes the Court's po-
litical weakness vis-&-vis the executive and legislative branches to
argue for restraint. He echoes the remark in the Federalist Papers
45. See DWORKIN, supra note 8, at 137.
46. Historical analysis of the exercise of judicial review by the Supreme Court demon-
strates varying degrees of activism, during different periods of the Court's history, concern-
ing different issues. See C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (1922);
McCLOSKEY, supra note 37.
47. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975). He
makes a framers' intent argument for his view in Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitu-
tion: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843 (1978).
48. Grey, 27 STAN. L. REV. at 705 ("courts do appropriately apply values not articu-
lated in the constitutional text, and appropriately apply them in determining the constitu-
tionality of legislation").
49. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
POLITICS (1962) (alluding to THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 483 (Hamilton) (Lodge ed. 1888)).
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that whereas the legislative branch controls the purse and the ex-
ecutive wields the sword, the judiciary has few, if any, resources,
except the principled nature and moral authority of its opinions.
For this reason, the Court ought to use aggressively both the jus-
ticiability doctrines-advisory opinion, mootness, ripeness, politi-
cal question, and standing-which permit it to decline deciding a
case and the less controversial decisional principles, like vagueness
and delegation of powers, in order to conserve its power.5°
Jesse Choper has combined the insights of activists, like Grey,
and of conservatives, like Bickel, to fashion a compromise position.
He argues that courts are especially equipped to defend individual
rights and that they should zealously do so.51 On the other hand,
he maintains that courts should not police the relationships be-
tween states and the federal government or between the branches
of the federal government. These entities themselves, he concludes
from a study of such conflicts, are better equipped than the federal
courts to resolve their own conflicts.5 2
B. How Should the Constitution Be Interpreted?
The second question that a constitutional jurisprudence must
address is what principle or principles should guide the Court in
interpreting the Constitution. As will be seen, the answer to this
second question significantly affects the scope of judicial review.
The question of interpretation, as noted above, arises both from
the lack of an explicit interpretational principle in the text of the
Constitution itself and the necessity to use an extraneous interpre-
tational principle in interpreting any text.
As with the scope of judicial review, a variety of interpreta-
tional principles has been advocated in theories of constitutional
jurisprudence. These competing principles reveal different conclu-
sions about the concerns listed above. These theories of constitu-
tional interpretation have been characterized as being noninterpre-
tivist, interpretivist, or a combination of these two. 53 As one would
expect, few people hold either view in the extreme. One example
from each extreme should suffice to demonstrate how each has
dealt with the concerns.
Grey's theory about the "unwritten constitution" provides an
example of extreme noninterpretivism. Under Grey's approach, the
Constitution serves merely to inspire and to authorize the courts to
50. Id. at 111-98.
51. CHOPER, supra note 2, at 167-68.
52. Id. at 258-59, 379, 414.
53. See, e.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST. A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REvIEw 1 (1980).
272 [Vol. 46
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protect individual rights through such broad provisions as the due
process and equal protection clauses. 4 It is up to the courts to dis-
cover what "liberty" or "property" interest or minority is to be
protected and what measures must be taken to protect them.
Thus, individual rights are valued more than the democratic pro-
cess or federalism concerns, and great faith and responsibility is
placed upon the courts' ability to protect them.
At the opposite end of the spectrum lies the radical interpre-
tivist theory of Raoul Berger. To use Ronald Dworkin's helpful
distinction,55 Berger's interpretivist theory would require the
courts to unearth and enforce the particular "conception" of the
framers of the Constitution rather than to interpret the "concept"
embodied in the constitutional text and to apply it to a modern
society. Consequently, Berger's best known work is an attempt to
perform an historical exegesis of the fourteenth amendment.5 6
Based on this exegesis, he severely criticizes how the Court, in his
opinion, has interpreted the due process and equal protection
clauses more broadly than the framers intended.
Berger's constitutional jurisprudence demonstrates an un-
waivering trust in and commitment to the democratic process and
a corresponding doubt about the capabilities of the judiciary to ar-
ticulate the will of the people. His response to the tendency of ac-
tivists to call upon the courts to solve social problems, even those
involving individual rights, is that the framers intended the
amendment process to be the only remedy for new problems of a
constitutional magnitude.57 Every generation has the opportunity
to update the conceptions of the framers by amending the Consti-
tution; in lieu of constitutional amendment, legislation and the
acts of electorally accountable agencies articulate the current will
of the people. Likewise, the public's failure to amend the Constitu-
tion must be interpreted as their acquiescence to the framers'
conceptions.
In addition to these two extremes, there are more centrist the-
ories, both interpretivist and noninterpretivist. The centrist inter-
pretivist theories would permit judges to look beyond the mere
conceptions of the framers of the Constitution toward the concepts
embodied in the text. Justice Hugo Black, for example, thought
54. Grey, supra note 48, at 708-09.
55. DWORKIN, supra note 8, at 134-36.
56. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT (1977). For a response to his critics, see Berger, The Scope of Judicial Review:
An Ongoing Debate, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 527 (1979).
57. BERGER, GOVERNMENT By JUDICIARY 132, 299.
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that the Court should derive these concepts from the plain mean-
ing of the text and then apply these concepts to the current state
of society.5 8 Black's jurisprudence made it impossible to character-
ize him as advocating judicial restraint or activism. When he
thought that the plain meaning of the text addressed a particular
legal controversy, he took so activist a stance that he was criticized
for being an absolutist.59 In other decisions, for example in Gris-
wold v. Connecticut,"0 he demonstrated great judicial restraint
when he thought that the particular right being advocated did not
have a textual basis.
Black's method of interpretation reflected his resolution of the
balance between democracy, individual rights, and the other con-
cerns that have been noted. His adherence to the text provided
what he considered to be intelligible limits to both the democratic
processes and the courts' vindication of individual rights. Likewise,
he could assert both the importance of federalism and the
supremacy of the Constitution. Furthermore, by permitting judges
great latitude in applying these broad concepts to particular situa-
tions, Black demonstrated a good deal of faith in the ability of
courts to limit the democratic processes, when resolving issues of
individual rights.
Black's interpretational principle, however, has been criticized
as being too simplistic."' As argued above, since the text of the
Constitution cannot interpret itself, it would be likely that nine
different justices using Black's principle would both understand
the text and apply the concept derived from it in different ways.
Likewise, such an approach does not explicitly provide a way to
understand the concepts of particular provisions in their constitu-
tional context.
Somewhere between the jurisprudential theories of Black and
Berger lies the theory of Ronald Dworkin. Dworkin criticizes both
positions like Berger's that limit interpretation to the discovery of
mere historical conceptions62 and the positivist positions like
Black's that seem to leave a great deal of the interpretation to a
58. See H. BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 14 (1968). See, e.g., In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 377-78 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting) (the "document itself should be our guide, not
our own concept of what is fair, decent and right. . . . I prefer to put my faith in the words
of the Constitution itself . . ").
59. For an example of Black's "absolutism," see Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36,
68 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting). For criticism of his "absolutism," see BICKEL, supra note
49, at 141, 162-63.
60. 381 U.S. 479, 508 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
61. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 53, at 11-41.
62. See DWORKIN, supra note 8, at 134-36.
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judge's discretion. Instead, he argues, judges ought to base their
decisions on the concepts embodied in the text. But their interpre-
tations must square with a constitutional theory that includes both
the institutional history and the political morality in which the in-
stitutional history is embedded." By appealing to political moral-
ity embedded in the Constitution, judges can avoid either limiting
their decisions to the particular conceptions of the framers, or
merely basing them on the judge's own political and moral convic-
tions. Ultimately, Dworkin seems to assert, one of the outcomes
advocated in the case would better fit this morality than any of the
others and thus should be chosen.5
Dworkin's theory is explicitly based on his evaluation of the
strengths and weaknesses of both the legislative branch and the
judiciary. Legislatures, and democratic processes in general, he ar-
gues, are best suited to enact "policy" whereas judges are best
suited to discover and apply "principles."" Policy takes into ac-
count the contingencies of society at a particular time and repre-
sents an attempt to determine what is best for the general welfare.
Principles, however, are not transitory, being grounded in a stable
view of human nature and the rights of individuals implicit in that
view.
For Dworkin, individual rights, whether in conflict with other
individuals or the government, are best understood and protected
by the judiciary. Principles or rights are not only more stable than
legislatively enacted policies but they also have a higher priority
than policies. When the two conflict, the rights of the individual
are permitted to "trump" the will of the majority. 7 Thus, judges
should not be activists in the sense of replacing legislative policies
with their own, but only in vindicating individual rights.
Centrist noninterpretivist theories do not require as isolated
an interpretation of each provision of the text, as do the interpre-
tivist theories examined above. They do, however, place more ex-
63. Id. at 31-39.
64. Dworkin argues that the judge must first turn to "the constitutional scheme as a
whole" in order to construe a particular right. Id. at 106. Further, this "scheme" (what
Dworkin also calls the institutional history) may be insufficient to construe a right. Then,
the judge must turn to political philosophy. Id. at 107. But to turn to political philosophy is
not to exercise a noninterpretivist discretion. The moral concepts to which the judge appeals
are those "presupposed by the laws and institutions of the community." Id. at 126. It may
be necessary, however, to articulate these "presupposed" moral concepts by examining the
life of the concept in the political and philosophical community. Id. at 126-27, 149.
65. Id. at 81 ("even when no settled rule disposes of the case, one party may neverthe-
less have a right to win"). See also Hart, supra note 8.
66. DWORKIN, supra note 8, at 82-86.
67. Id. at 85.
15
NettikSimmons: State Constitutional Jurisprudence
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1985
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
plicit limits on judicial review than Grey would. These limits usu-
ally consist of a unitary, substantive, or procedural principle of
interpretation through which the rest of the Constitution is
understood.
The best example of such a theory is that of John Hart Ely.
His principle of interpretation is what I call the pursuit of the
ideal democracy. 8 Ely considers all of the other concerns of consti-
tutional jurisprudence-individual rights, federalism, and the legit-
imate function of the judiciary-subsidiary to an overarching con-
cern to attain this ideal democracy. As a result, due process or
equal protection, for example, are directed only toward improving
the democratic processes and ensuring that each person has a right
to participate in those processes; they have nothing to say about
the outcomes of those processes.69 Likewise, concerns about feder-
alism would be reduced to a more general goal to facilitate democ-
racy. Ely places upon the courts the responsibility to facilitate the
democratic process because of the federal courts' nondemocratic
structure. This structure gives them the perspective necessary to
police the democratic processes. Judicial review is beneficial to the
democratic processes so long as the courts do not attempt to sub-
stitute their judgments for the actual outcomes of these
processes. 70
Justice Richard Neely, a member of the West Virginia Su-
preme Court, has a similarly structured theory. Like Ely, he con-
siders it to be the courts' role to facilitate government processes:
"constitutional law is about institutions and the way they interact
with other institutions. ' 71 The primary function of judicial review
is to bring "the myth system and the operational system into align-
ment. '72 The myth system, for Neely, consists of our ideals about
how government should function and what general values it should
espouse. The operational system, of course, is how the government
actually affects our lives.
Thus, the court has the responsibility to address the failures
68. ELY, supra note 53, at 77 (The issue is "whether the opportunity to participate
either in the political processes by which values are appropriately identified and accommo-
dated, or in the accommodation those processes have been reached, has been unduly
constricted.").
69. Id. at 101-03. In Chapters 2 and 3, Ely criticizes the attempt by the Court to prop-
agate substantive values either through interpretivism or noninterpretivism. Id. at 11-72.
70. But see Dworkin's criticism that Ely's attempt to have the courts escape making
value judgments fails. Ely neglects to see how there is a substantive question involved even
in his procedure-oriented theory: what is the right conception of democracy? Dworkin, The
Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 469 (1981).
71., R. NEELY, How COURTS GOVERN AMERICA 10 (1981).
72. Id. at 113.
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of the legislative and executive branches to function democrati-
cally. Neely has concluded that the malfunction that most charac-
terizes the legislative branch (he is referring both to Congress and
his experience with his own state legislature) is inertia. The legisla-
tive structure, he claims, is designed to kill bills, not to pass
them.73 Even when the legislature acts, its laws very often consist
of special interest legislation because it is only the pressure of spe-
cial interest groups' lobbyists that push a bill through the process.
The courts' job should be to force the legislatures to be more con-
cerned with the state's general welfare by attacking special interest
legislation with the equal protection clause. The executive branch,
he believes, has the opposite problem: it is self-serving and thus
overactive. 4 Thus, the courts should constrain the bureaucracy by
forcing them to comply with the principles of due process.
Other theories that appeal to a single principle have been pro-
pounded by commentators like Herbert Wechsler 75 and Alexander
Bickel.76 Like other centrist noninterpretivists, they allow for lim-
ited evolution in constitutional law. They do not, however, use a
substantive principle of interpretation like democracy or the ideals
about the operation of governmental institutions to structure this
development. Both Wechsler and Bickel responded to what they
considered the ad hoc judicial activism of the Warren Court by
urging the courts to interpret the Constitution according to "neu-
tral principles" 77 or through a "more faithful adherence to the
method of analytical reason. '7 Since reason or neutral principles
would be applied to substantive texts, these theories closely resem-
ble a kind of interpretivism. On the other hand, there is the sug-
gestion that new substantive values might be discovered through
this method since the court is to be "a voice of reason, charged
with the creative function of discerning afresh and of articulating
and developing impersonal and durable principles. '7 9
If Bickel's interpretational theory and his concern about ex-
cessive judicial review are understood together, an interesting bal-
ancing of jurisprudential concerns results. Bickel's interpretational
73. Id. at 55.
74. Id. at 113.
75. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1959).
76. A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (2d ed. 1978).
77. Wechsler, supra note 75, at 19 ("A principled decision, in the sense I have in mind,
is one that rests on reasons with respect to all the issues in the case, reasons that in their
generality and their neutrality transcend any immediate result that is involved.").
78. BICKEL, supra note 76, at 173.
79. Id. at 98 (quoting Hart, Forward: The Time-Chart of the Justices, 73 HARv. L.
REV. 84, 99 (1959)).
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theory, like Dworkin's, seems to emphasize the unique capacity of
the courts to discover, develop, and apply principles. His theory
about judicial review, on the other hand, is sensitive to the struc-
tural limitations of the courts vis-A-vis the other governmental in-
stitutions. The result is that the courts must use their capacities
with prudence. If they act rashly, their power will be eroded and
their contribution of principles to society will be of no
consequence.
V. STATE CONSTITUTIONS, STATE COURTS, AND JURISPRUDENTIAL
CONCERNS
Now that the major concerns addressed by federal constitu-
tional jurisprudential theories have been analyzed, it is appropriate
to evaluate their relevance to state constitutions and state court
judicial review. The following section examines general features of
state constitutions and governments. These generalizations are
only intended to question the relevance of the complete adoption
by states of a federal constitutional jurisprudence and to suggest
how such theories might need to be altered in considering state
constitutions. Thus, what follows is not a full-blown theory of state
constitutional jurisprudence. Since each state is unique in many
important respects, a constitutional jurisprudence must be devel-
oped for each state. This task is left to others.
A. Democracy Versus Individual Rights
It is clear from an examination of federal constitutional juris-
prudence that the primary concern has been what ought to be the
relationship between democratic processes and individual rights
and what ought to be the courts' role in it. Although the various
theories of judicial review reflect their adherents' subjective valua-
tion of the importance of democratic government or individual
rights, other factors do enter in.
Because the federal Constitution is two hundred years old, ex-
tremely difficult to amend, and fundamental law for the entire na-
tion, it makes uneasy those who cherish democracy and frustrates
those who seek fundamental changes in national policy. Likewise,
federal judicial review has an inherently nondemocratic, if not an-
tidemocratic, character because all federal judges (though ap-
pointed and approved by elected officials) are not elected and serve
for life. Consequently, these features of the federal Constitution
and of the federal judiciary play an important role in how a theory
limits or encourages judicial review and construes the constitu-
tional text.
[Vol. 46
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Most state constitutions and judiciaries do not share these fea-
tures. To amend state constitutions, unlike the federal Constitu-
tion, does not require garnering as large a consensus throughout as
large and geographically, culturally, and politically diverse a juris-
diction. Thus, state citizens have a greater opportunity to amend
their constitutions in order to articulate new shared ideals or indi-
vidual rights. A large number of states in the 1970's did so. The
new rights have included state equal rights amendments, rights for
the handicapped, rights to a clean environment, and the right of
privacy. 0
Since the state jurisdiction is comparatively small, there is less
reason to object to stating these ideals or rights either in very spe-
cific terms or in very broad terms. Many state constitutions have
or have had very detailed constitutional provisions, which by limit-
ing their discretion, expressed great distrust in the branches of
state government."1 On the other hand, the relative ease with
which state constitutions can be amended might justify greater use
of broadly formulated state provisions and of the discretion of
state judiciaries in reviewing the acts of state government. A judi-
cial construction of a broad constitutional provision that was sim-
ply out of touch with the current ideals of the state could be ve-
toed through the democratic process of constitutional amendment.
An example of this dialectic between the judiciary and the public
occurred in California in the early 1970's. In 1972, in People v. An-
derson,2 the California Supreme Court declared the death penalty
to be unconstitutional. The next year, however, the people of Cali-
fornia overruled the court's decision, reinstating the death penalty
by constitutional amendment.83
Unlike federal judges, most state justices and judges are either
elected to the bench or subject to retention elections at the end of
their terms."' This feature of state judiciaries changes the an-
tidemocratic character of judicial review. Nevertheless, it is not
fully democratic; because state citizens elect judges, knowing that
on occasion they strike down or enjoin the acts of other elected
officials, the election of judges takes on a character different from
the election of other officials. Ideally, the election of judges repre-
80. See Galie, supra note 39.
81. See D. LOPACH, L. McKINSEY, T. PAYNE, E. WALDRON, J. CALVERT & M. BROWN, WE
THE PEOPLE OF MONTANA... : THE WORKINGS OF A POPULAR GOVERNMENT 2-8 (1983) [here-
inafter LOPACH].
82. 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972).
83. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 27 (adopted, Nov. 7, 1972).
84. See S. LOWE, RESOURCE MATERIALS FOR NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON JUDICIAL SELEC-
TION AND TENURE 16-21 (1974).
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sents the attempt to select persons of principle who in the heat of
controversy will persuade the public to abide by the constitutional
principles they have adopted for themselves. Thus, the election of
judges, like the adoption of constitutional rights for individuals,
expresses an affirmation of judicial review.
Another important distinction between federal and state
judges is that federal judges have had solely an interpretive func-
tion: they are charged with interpreting the Constitution, federal
statutes, and federal regulations.8 5 State judges, however, have had
a common law tradition of making law within certain fields, for
example in tort law.86 This common law tradition in the state judi-
ciaries demonstrates two things. First, it evidences an acquiescence
to a judicial lawmaking function by the public. Second, it shows
that at least where individual rights are concerned, state courts
have the institutional ability and legal resources to construe state
constitutions more broadly than the federal Constitution may be
construed by federal courts.
B. Federalism and State Constitutions
Although states are subdivided into counties, this relationship
between state and county governments vastly differs from the rela-
tionship between the federal and state governments, called federal-
ism.87 Therefore, the ways in which concerns of federalism affect
theories of federal constitutional jurisprudence should be closely
scrutinized by state courts.
One feature of this concern of federalism is a mistrust about
the degree of power a single court, namely the United States Su-
preme Court, should have over the lives of hundreds of millions of
persons living in diverse geographical and cultural environments.8 e
85. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
86. For an argument that the common law lawmaking function of the courts ought to
be revived by granting them the power to overrule obsolete statutes, see G. CALABRESI, A
COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
87. Although there is a possibility for more powerful local governments in states, like
Montana, whose constitutions provide for "home-rule" powers, local governments never pos-
sess the sovereignty that states possess. Whereas it is "the state legislature that determines
the availability, means of adoption, and scope of these powers," LOPACH, supra note 81, at
226, the states possess inherent sovereignty and powers, limited only by those powers specif-
ically granted to the federal government.
88. The classic statement of the principle of federalism is Justice Black's opinion in
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971):
This underlying reason for restraining courts of equity from interfering with crim-
inal prosecutions is reinforced by an even more vital consideration, the notion of
"comity," that is, a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact
that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and
a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the
[Vol. ,46
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Such responsibility requires that the Supreme Court proceed very
cautiously in reviewing the acts of state governments before impos-
ing a narrow rule upon the legislatures and agencies of fifty states.
It is true that the Court has some structural capacity to be sensi-
tive to the possible impacts of its decisions on diverse states since
it receives a great number of amici briefs and since its members, at
times, have represented a cross section of America. Nevertheless,
the diversity of the fifty states cautions against excessive federal
judicial activism.
Individual states, on the other hand, are significantly more ho-
mogeneous and state courts are responsible for far fewer persons,
agencies, and inferior courts. Likewise, most states have require-
ments that state judges have practiced in the state before they can
be appointed or elected to the bench."9 Further, in states like Mon-
tana, where there are regions-for example, urban and rural ar-
eas-with different political, cultural, and legal perspectives, there
often is significant representation of those diverse areas on the ap-
pellate courts. Thus, it is possible for state judges to have more
insight into the fiscal, administrative, political, and cultural char-
acter of state government and to use this insight in responsive ju-
dicial review.90
Moreover, the ideal of federalism also has an optimistic aspect
in its concern for decentralization of power that has been often
mentioned by the federal courts. Federalism allows and encourages
the states to serve as laboratories to test principles and policies
that might someday be applicable to the entire nation.91 This ex-
States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in
their separate ways. This, perhaps for lack of a better and clearer way to describe
it, is referred to by many as "Our Federalism," and one familiar with the profound
debates that ushered our Federal Constitution into existence is bound to respect
those who remain loyal to the ideals and dreams of "Our Federalism." The con-
cept does not mean blind deference to "States' Rights" any more than it means
centralization of control over every important issue in our National Government
and its courts. The Framers rejected both these courses. What the concept does
represent is a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of
both State and National Governments, and in which the National Government,
anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal inter-
ests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the
legitimate activities of the States.
89. See, e.g., MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 9 (must have been a resident for two years and
have been admitted to the Montana Bar for five years); Mo. CONST. art. V, § 21 (required to
have been a qualified voter in the state for nine years).
90. For one study made of a number of state judiciaries that confirms this, see H.
GLICK, SUPREME COURT IN STATE POLITICS: AN INVESTIGATION OF THE JUDICIAL ROLE (1971)
(finding that state appellate court justices usually had been very involved in state and local
politics prior to serving on the court).
91. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dis-
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perimental function, however, need not be confined to state legisla-
tures or executive branches. State courts also could assist each
other in the development of state constitutional law just as in the
past they have experimented and learned from each other in com-
mon law. Perhaps, the day will come when federal courts are citing
state constitutional case law as persuasive authority for a particu-
lar construction of a federal constitutional provision.
Finally, the principle of federalism affirms the benefits of hav-
ing a federal government. The federal constitutional Bill of Rights
and the federal courts' construction and application of those rights
will continue to serve a very important purpose. Just as the rela-
tively homogeneous character of the states has its virtues, so too it
has faults. Whereas certain new ideals or rights may receive a con-
sensus in a particular state, others which impact a minority in that
state may be rejected.92 The federal Constitution can serve to en-
sure that at least the most fundamental rights be accorded to all
persons, notwithstanding the consensus attained in any one state.
9 3
Likewise, the nondemocratic character of the federal judiciary
might well complement the elected judiciaries of the states.
C. State Courts and Coordinate Branches of Government
The federal Constitution assigns particular powers to each of
the three coordinate branches of federal government-the execu-
tive, the legislative, and the judiciary. This specification of the le-
gitimate powers of each of the branches was intended by the fram-
ers to protect the sovereign domain of the states and individuals
by both limiting and fragmenting the federal government's powers.
It is around this fragmentation of the powers of the federal govern-
ment that the federal separation of powers doctrine has been de-
veloped by the federal courts. It is the doctrine of the separation of
powers that is invoked by the Court both when it settles a contro-
versy between the other two branches and when it defers to the
prerogative of one of the branches in a controversy between that
branch and a state or individual. 4
Because states were intended to be the primary governments
senting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.").
92. See CHOPER, supra note 2, at 252.
93. See Note, supra note 28, at 1357 (arguing that the federal Bill of Rights should be
a "settled floor of rights" and that state rights could "amplify, or supplement" this federal
floor).
94. See, e.g., Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 462 U.S. 919, 951-52
(1983); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703-05 (1974).
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in our federal system, they had no need for such specific grants of
power or limitations. Despite a general mistrust of government
during earlier periods of state constitution writing, some states
now have more flexible assignments of powers to their branches of
government. 5 Nevertheless, a number of state constitutions, unlike
the federal Constitution, do have an express statement regarding
the separation of powers of the branches of state government. 6
The existence of such an express statement could have a number
of jurisprudential implications. For example, it could strengthen
the judiciary's claim to be the branch to render the final interpre-
tation about what is unconstitutional. Thus, it might justify zeal-
ous review of the coordinate branches to ensure that they are not
exceeding their powers. Where a state constitution's provisions
describing the powers of the respective branches are very detailed,
the court would most likely rely on the text. But where the consti-
tution has not specified the powers of each, the court would have
to rely on a structural analysis like Ely's or Neely's. From the con-
stitutional text, and state history or tradition, it would have to de-
termine what function the coordinate branches serve in that state.
An express separation of powers statement could also require
judicial restraint. The constitution would prohibit the court from
usurping the powers of another branch by substituting the court's
judgment for the latter's. There is some evidence that these provi-
sions have engendered such restraint in state court judicial review.
One commentator, for example, has found that the political ques-
tion doctrine is rigorously applied in state constitutional
adjudication.9 7
In addition to explicit separation of powers clauses, there are
other significant differences between the state and federal struc-
tures of government that affect this jurisprudential concern. As has
been noted, state courts, unlike federal courts, have had a law-
making function in areas of state law. Also, as of 1975, ten states
permitted courts to render advisory opinions at the request of the
other two branches.98 Both of these features demonstrate a more
active role for the courts in state government.
Finally, the history of state constitutions and the amount of
federal intervention into the operations of state government to en-
95. Compare, e.g., the detailed 1889 Montana Constitution to the lean 1972 Montana
Constitution. See also LOPACH, supra note 81, at 62, 111.
96. See, e.g., MONT. CONST. art. III, § 1; ARnz. CONST. art. III.
97. See Stern, The Political Question Doctrine in State Courts, 35 S.C.L. REV. 405,
411 (1984).
98. See Comment, The State Advisory Opinion in Perspective, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 81
(1975).
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force due process and equal protection suggest that state govern-
ments are more likely to fail to function democratically. Perhaps,
because of the homogeneity or the small size of state governments,
they have been more susceptible to control by political machines. 99
Also, state legislatures that only meet biennially may have
problems with delegation of their responsibilities to the executive
branch.100 Further, some states may not have the resources to
equip their legislatures with significant staffs or to administer the
laws they have passed.
These sorts of problems have plagued the operation of state
government in the past. If they continue, vigorous judicial review
might be warranted. Such review, however, need not consist in
bailing out the other branches by simply substituting the court's
judgment for that of another branch; rather, it would publicly hold
the legislature or an agency accountable to fulfill its constitutional
duty.
D. Justiciability: Strengths and Weaknesses of State Courts
A nonjusticiable case is one that for one reason or another
cannot be adjudicated. Reasons for nonjusticiability of constitu-
tional cases have included lack of standing, ripeness, mootness,
and that adjudication of the controversy would require the Court
to answer a political question."' All of these reasons follow from a
concept of the Court as solely a decider of controversies. As such,
the Court may interpret the law only to the extent such interpreta-
tion is absolutely necessary to deciding the case. What these jus-
ticiability doctrines do is prevent the Court from interpreting the
constitution when there is not a real controversy that requires a
decision.
The general principles of these doctrines have been applied by
Anglo-American courts in all areas of the law.102 In federal law,
however, they have taken on an additional significance. Article III
of the federal Constitution gives the Supreme Court jurisdiction
only over "cases or controversies." Over the years, the Court has
fine-tuned these justiciability doctrines to construe its own appel-
99. See NEELY, supra note 71, at 115-16.
100. See LOPACH, supra note 81, at 69.
101. See BICKEL, supra note 49, at 111-98.
102. The principle behind the constitutional justiciability doctrines, that there must
be a bona fide controversy, is implied in such common law elements as damages, proximate
cause, and privity. For the procedural ability of appellate courts to decline review, see Ro-
senberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REv.
635, 643-50 (1971).
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late jurisdiction. In addition, commentators like Bickel have urged
the Court to invoke these doctrines frequently both as a matter of
preventing it from overstepping its legitimate function and as a
matter of prudently conserving its resources.
Some state constitutions, however, do not have express case or
controversy requirements.1 0 3 Nevertheless, most state courts have
some version of the justiciability doctrines that they use even in
common law adjudications. It is possible, however, that in constitu-
tional cases a number of state courts simply adopted federal stan-
dards of justiciability because since the adoption of the fourteenth
amendment, they have often been called upon to hear claims based
on the federal Constitution, which ultimately could be appealed to
the United States Supreme Court.
It is important that state courts that have no express constitu-
tional case or controversy requirement realize that they may be
free to adopt whatever standards of justiciability they believe are
consistent with the role of the judiciary in their state. In several
areas of constitutional law, some state courts have lower standing
requirements than the federal courts.10 4 Likewise, a number of
states permit their highest courts to render advisory opinions, the
very type of judicial activity that the federal case or controversy
requirement is intended to prohibit.10 5
There are additional features of many state judiciaries and
constitutions that would commend lower justiciability standards
for litigating state constitutional questions. First, some state con-
stitutions have provisions providing for a right to a judicial remedy
for injuries to a person that have been given new significance by
the courts.10 6 On its face, such a constitutional principle seems to
encourage adjudication.
Second, state courts do not have near the number of appeals
that the United States Supreme Court has. Thus, whereas the Su-
preme Court may have before it a number of cases on a certain
103. The Montana and Alaska Constitutions, for example, do not have this expression
in their judicial articles.
104. For example, some states have lower standing requirements to exclude evidence
improperly seized. See, e.g. State v. Settle, 122 N.H. 214, 218, 447 A.2d 1284, 1286 (1982);
Commonwealth v. Sell, 470 A.2d 457, 466 (Pa. 1983).
105. See Comment, supra note 97.
106. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 13; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 16; TEx. CONST. art. I, §
13. For two cases construing this provision, see White v. State, - Mont. __, 661 P.2d
1272 (1983) (holding that Montana's right to a judicial remedy provision is a fundamental
right justifying strict scrutiny of classifications that deny it); Sax v. Votteler, - Tex.
-, 648 S.W.2d 661 (1983) (holding that a statute abolishing the tolling of the statute of
limitations for medical malpractice actions brought by minors constitutes an unreasonable
denial of access to the courts).
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constitutional point appealed within a short span of time and thus
have the opportunity to select the one which has best framed the
issues, some state courts may be lucky to have a case on a particu-
lar constitutional provision come up every ten years. If on the basis
of other jurisprudential concerns an active state judiciary is called
for, justiciability standards may need to be lowered to permit the
desired level of judicial activism.
High standards of justiciability-especially of the sort that
Bickel advocates-might not be as essential for state court adjudi-
cation of state constitutional issues as it is for the federal courts.
The conservation of respect for the judiciary and of its resources,
which Bickel thinks justifies high justiciability standards, is ame-
liorated by the features of state courts and constitutions that have
been examined in the preceding subsections. Likewise, the greater
propriety of state court activism would justify justiciability stan-
dards no more stringent than what would be necessary to construe
adequately the state constitutional provision at issue.
E. Special Features of Interpreting State Constitutions
State constitutions, like the federal Constitution, do not con-
tain provisions stating how the rest of the constitution should be
interpreted. Certainly, the ways in which each state deals with the
jurisprudential concerns that have been discussed above will fun-
damentally affect the principles of interpretation that are accepted
in that state, just as they have affected principles of interpretation
in theories of federal constitutional jurisprudence.
There are, however, several other features of some state con-
stitutions not yet discussed that might affect how one decides to
interpret those constitutions. First, the fact that major portions of
some state constitutions have been revised in the last twenty-five
years 0 7 and that many significant provisions have been added to
the constitutions in the last fifteen years 1 8 might call for a differ-
ent method of interpretation than what might be applied to our
two hundred year old federal Constitution that has received exten-
sive judicial construction. State courts, faced with the prospect of
interpreting their own constitutions without precedent from their
own courts, might lose their nerve and uncritically apply case law
from federal courts or other state courts.
Despite the paucity of case law, however, recent constitutional
107. States that in the last twenty-five years have revised at least significant blocks of
their state constitutions include: Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana,
Michigan, Montana, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and Virginia.
108. See Galie, supra note 39.
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provisions do have at least one advantage over older provisions.
Because they have been passed recently, the court has firsthand
experience of the way these values arose in the populace and were
articulated in the constitution. In addition, whereas extensive his-
toric research is necessary to understand the intentions of the
framers of the federal Constitution, the delegates to a recent con-
stitutional convention or the legislators who proposed recent
amendments to it can be interviewed about their intentions. 10 9
Finally, though a state may not have "institutional materials"
as rich as the Declaration of Independence or the Federalist Pa-
pers, judges and lawyers have a number of valuable resources to
enrich the meaning of constitutional texts. For example, a state
may have very sensitive historians who have captured not only the
events but also the very spirit of the state.110 Likewise, the pream-
ble to the constitution, if it is not considered legally enforceable,
might at least express the tone of the rest of the constitution.
Similarily, purpose clauses in state legislation passed pursuant to a
particular constitutional provision can provide the courts with ad-
ditional interpretations."'
VI. CONCLUSION
The increase in cases brought and decisions rendered on state
constitutional grounds in the last ten years ought to be placed in
its historical perspective. Although for most of this century state
constitutions were overshadowed by the fourteenth amendment,
they played a significant role in the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
109. Interviewing delegates to a recent state constitutional convention would be akin
to using historical sources or legislative history to construe older constitutions or amend-
ments. There would, of course, be a danger that the delegates interviewed would not or
could not accurately describe the concerns of a significant number of the delegates, but this
danger exists even when it is a transcript, record, or historical scholarship that is cited by
the court. Further, Montana, for example, in its Administrative Procedure Act, has estab-
lished a similar procedure-a legislative poll-to ascertain legislative intent for use in court
proceedings involving the determination of the validity of administrative rules. See MONT.
CODE ANN. § 2-4-403, -404 (1983).
110. For example, Montana has the works of K. Ross Toole: MONTANA: AN UNCOMMON
LAND (1959); TWENTIETH-CENTURY MONTANA: A STATE OF ExTREmEs (1972); THE RAPE OF
THE GREAT PLAINS: NORTHWEST AMERICA, CATTLE AND COAL (1976). For an analysis of the use
of history in judicial opinions by the United States Supreme Court, see C. MILLER, THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY 190-91 (1969) (describing four different uses of
history: (1) to determine intent of framers, (2) to trace the evolution of a constitutional
issue, (3) to symbolize the "spirit of the constitution," and (4) to emphasize a change in
social circumstance).
111. How much deference the courts should give such legislative glosses, of course,
would depend on the constitutional relationship between the legislature and the judiciary in
a particular state.
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turies, serving as both a model for the federal Bill of Rights and a
basis for judicial review.
In addition to reflecting on the historical roots of state consti-
tutions and state court judicial review, lawyers and judges should
begin to develop a theory of constitutional jurisprudence for their
state constitution. A constitutional jurisprudence will enable
judges to approach their constitution with a theory that takes into
account both the constitution and its cultural, historical, and polit-
ical context. Well developed theories of constitutional jurispru-
dence will both inhibit ad hoc interpretations (or at least attempt
to justify them) and provide a context for debate about the as-
sumptions that judges inevitably make in deciding whether to en-
gage in judicial review and how to interpret a constitutional
provision.
Although theories of federal constitutional jurisprudence pro-
vide important materials for developing a state constitutional ju-
risprudence, the configuration of jurisprudential concerns that the
federal theories address must be distinguished from the configura-
tions posed by state constitutions and judicial review by state
courts. By critically examining theories of federal constitutional ju-
risprudence, state courts will be better able to evaluate the persua-
siveness of federal case authority in construing a state constitu-
tional provision. Such an analysis may also reveal jurisprudential
questions and concerns unique to state constitutions and point the
way toward developing a theory of state constitutional
jurisprudence.
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